In this paper I propose an account of representation for scientific models based on Kendall Walton's 'make-believe' theory of representation in art. I first set out the problem of scientific representation and respond to a recent argument due to Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen, which aims to show that the problem may be easily dismissed. I then introduce my account of models as props in games of make-believe and show how it offers a solution to the problem. Finally, I demonstrate an important advantage my account has over other theories of scientific representation. All existing theories analyse scientific representation in terms of relations, such as similarity or denotation. By contrast, my account does not take representation in modelling to be essentially relational. For this reason, it can accommodate a group of models often ignored in discussions of scientific representation, namely models which are representational but which represent no actual object.
I

Representation in modelling (i)
The problem of scientific representation
When we think of scientific models, perhaps the first things that come to mind are 'ball-and-stick' models of molecules or astronomical models of the solar system. Let us refer to such models as physical models, to indicate that they are actual, physical objects. Most philosophical work focuses not on physical models but on what I shall call theoretical modelling. Suppose we want to predict the behaviour of a bob bouncing on the end of a spring. To do so we might use Hooke's law to formulate the equation of motion for a simple harmonic oscillator, m d 2 x / dt 2 =−kx , where m is the mass of the bob, k is the 'spring constant' and x is the displacement from the equilibrium position. In using this equation we make a number of assumptions: we take the bob to be a point mass m subject only to a uniform gravitational field and a linear restoring force exerted by a massless frictionless spring with spring constant k attached to a rigid surface. This is what Nancy Cartwright (1983) calls a 'prepared description' of the bouncing spring system. 1 We realise that this description is false, but using it allows us to apply our equation of motion and calculate predictions for the bob's behaviour. This is an example of theoretical modelling: we model the bob as a simple harmonic oscillator.
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Many physical models represent some object or event in the world. Crick and Watson's famous model represents the DNA molecule. The astronomical models represent the solar system. An engineer's scale model might represent a bridge. We also represent the world through theoretical modelling. Of course, despite Cartwright's terminology, we cannot regard our 'prepared description' or equation of motion as straightforward descriptions of the bouncing spring; we realise that the bob is not a point mass and do not claim that it is. And yet we do represent the spring when we model it.
Intuitively, we might say that we represent it as a simple harmonic oscillator. Put simply, the problem of representation for scientific models is to understand how such cases of representation work. In the case of theoretical modelling, this problem takes different forms depending on which view we adopt of the ontology of theoretical models. For example, according to Ronald Giere, a theoretical model like our model of the bouncing spring is not the prepared description and equation of motion that we 1 Cartwright (1983) .
Note that I use the term 'theoretical' only to indicate that scientists do not construct a physical model of the system modelled, and not to imply that the model is derived from some existing theory, like Newtonian mechanics. Recent case studies suggest scientists must often go beyond existing theory to model a system; for example, see Morgan and Morrison (1999) . 3 For my own view of the ontology of theoretical modelling, see Toon (2010). write down, but some form of abstract entity that they define. Giere offers an indirect, two-stage, view of theoretical modelling: First, prepared descriptions and theoretical laws define abstract objects. Second, these objects represent (or, as Giere would put it, are used to represent) the system being modelled. If we adopt this view, then, understanding how we represent the bouncing spring is a matter of understanding the relation between the spring and the abstract simple harmonic oscillator defined by our prepared description and equation of motion.
To understand the problem of representation for models, it is helpful to look to another representational device: pictures. Like models, many pictures are representational, and some represent actual objects or events. Jacques-Louis David's Napoleon Crossing the Saint Bernard We have a name for the sort of representation pictures provide. We say that David's painting pictures or depicts Napoleon, and that Constable's landscape depicts Salisbury Cathedral. Of course, pictures represent in other ways too, apart from depiction. David's painting might be said to represent the glory of France, or Constable's 'the culmination of his numerous treatments of Salisbury Cathedral '. 4 Such is the vagueness of the term 'represent'. But it is one particular form of representation that pictures offer, namely depiction, which theories of pictorial representation seek to explain.
We lack a name for the way that models represent. If we say merely that models represent their objects then we are likely to be misled, for the word 'representation' is used in so many different ways. Crick and Watson's model might also be said to represent the greatest achievement of British science or Bohr's model a belief in the simplicity of the atomic realm. In analogy to pictorial representation, then, we might label the form of representation we are interested in modelrepresentation. Crick and Watson's model, we shall say, model-represents the DNA molecule and Bohr's model model-represents the atom. 4 Salisbury Cathedral from the Meadows on www.nationalgallery.org.uk
We must be careful here, however. The variety of scientific models is remarkable. What reason do we have for thinking that all of these models represent in the same way? Does Crick and Watson's model represent the DNA molecule in the same way as Bohr's model represents the atom, for example, or our model represents the bouncing spring? Might there not be many forms of modelrepresentation? Here the contrast with depiction is telling. The variety of things we call 'pictures' is also remarkable. It includes figurative paintings, Impressionist landscapes, political cartoons, children's drawings, stick figures and more. And yet despite their obvious differences, it is often thought that there is one form of representation that is common to all of these pictures, namely depiction. We lack the same intuitions for scientific models. Whether or not there is a form of representation common to both Crick and Watson's and Bohr's models, for example, would seem to be an open question that a theory of scientific representation must address. We should not assume, then, that there is one form of representation common to all scientific models:
there may be many different forms of model-representation.
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And we should also be careful not to assume that any of these forms of representation are unique to scientific models. Any, or even all, of the forms of model-representation that we identify may turn out to be employed by other representational devices, used either within or outside of science. Our theory of representation does not need to go on to say how, if at all, scientific models differ from these other representational devices, although this may be an interesting question in its own right.
The task of explaining how models represent is usually taken to be that of providing an account of a relation, between a model and that part of the world that it represents. For example, according to Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen, the central question concerning representation for scientific models is 'what constitutes the representation relation between a model and the world?' 6 The task for theories of depiction is often presented in the same way. A theory of depiction, it is often said, must tell us what the relation is between a picture and its subject, in virtue of which it depicts that subject.
The difficulty with presenting the task in this way, of course, is that many pictures have no actual subject. And yet it seems that a picture of a unicorn is still depictive, even though there is no unicorn that it depicts. In Section III of this paper, I will argue that the same problem arises for scientific models: many models are representational, even though they represent no actual object.
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If we want to allow that such models are representational then we are faced with a dilemma: either we postulate some entity that they represent or we cease to think of model-representation as essentially relational.
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Versions of this point may be found in Frigg (2006) , Hughes (1997) and Suárez (2003) , although each draw rather different lessons from it. 6 Callender and Cohen (2006), p68. See also Frigg (2006a) and Hughes (1997). 7 This problem is also raised by Suárez (2003) and Callender and Cohen (2006) . As we shall see in Section III, however, neither provide a solution.
We ought, therefore, to refrain from presenting our task as that of giving an account of representation as a relation if we do not want to commit ourselves prematurely to the first route out of this dilemma. understand how models represent, we will want to make further distinctions among models, distinguishing good from bad along various different dimensions. If someone wishes to reserve the term 'representation' for those models that fall only on the good side of one or more of these divides then we needn't quibble too much. The more important point is that our account of representation should provide us with the resources to make these distinctions amongst models.
(ii) Misrepresentation
8 Suárez (2003) , p226. See also Callender and Cohen (2006) and Frigg (2006a 
(iii) Does the problem exist?
The problem of representation in scientific modelling is now the focus of a burgeoning literature in the philosophy of science. Indeed, it is often referred to simply as 'the problem of scientific representation'. However, in a recent paper, Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen have argued that this attention is unwarranted. In fact, they claim, 'there is no special problem about scientific representation'.
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In this section, and the one that follows, I shall attempt to show why Callender and Cohen are wrong. In doing so, I hope to clarify further the nature of the problem that faces us.
Callender and Cohen argue that we should approach the problem of scientific representation from a stance which they label as 'General Griceanism'. According to this view, See Chapter 8 of Walton (1990) . more fully in Section II. For now, all that is important is that for Walton, depiction is explained in terms of particular acts of imaginings engaged in by the viewer of the picture: she imagines of her looking at the picture that it is an instance of looking at the object. Again, Walton's is a derivative account: it aims to explain depiction in terms of the representational capacities of mental states (in this case, imagination).
Either Goldman's or Walton's theories might constitute the first step in a General Gricean account of
depiction. Yet the two accounts are very different, and the continuing debate over depiction suggests that taking either step would be far from trivial. Moreover, neither Goldman nor Walton's account parallels the derivative account of scientific representation offered by Callender and Cohen.
Presumably, such an account would claim that a picture depicts its subject if the painter stipulates that it does and intends to bring about the belief in the viewer that it does. Neither Goldman nor Walton take such an act of stipulation to be sufficient for depiction. And it is clear why they do not, for stipulation is plainly not sufficient for depiction. Suppose we took a blank canvas and stipulated that it represented Napoleon, and that that we intended to bring about the belief in others that this canvas represented Napoleon. And suppose further that this intention was recognised and our audience did believe that the canvas represented Napoleon. The blank canvas might, then, be said to represent Napoleon, in some sense, but it would not depict him.
Adopting the General Gricean position with regard to pictures, then, does not commit us to the view that stipulation is sufficient for depiction, but instead leaves open many different ways of explaining depiction in terms of other, more fundamental forms of representation. Similarly, we might adopt a General Gricean approach to models without taking stipulation to be sufficient for modelrepresentation. Just as there are many different candidates for a derivative account of depiction, so there might be many different derivative accounts of model-representation. Nevertheless, we might still ask whether the account that Callender and Cohen propose is successful.
(iv) Stipulation and salt shakers
Is an act of stipulation sufficient for model-representation? To support their claim that it is, Callender and Cohen ask us to suppose that we were to pick up a salt shaker and stipulate to our dinner partner that it represents Madagascar. As long as our stipulation is understood, they point out, Let us again look to depiction. Perhaps the account of depiction that comes closest to claiming that stipulation is sufficient for depiction is Nelson Goodman's conventionalist account. According to Goodman, the relation between a picture and what it depicts is like that between a name and its referent; both refer to, stand for, or denote, their objects. Resemblance or similarity are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a picture to denote its object. In fact, 'almost anything may stand for almost anything else'..
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One way to establish denotation, it seems, is by stipulation. If we stipulate that the blank canvas represents Napoleon then the canvas may be said to denote Napoleon.
However, even Goodman does not take denotation to be sufficient for depiction. Instead, he recognises that his theory must account for the considerable intuitive differences between pictorial and non-pictorial representations. And he attempts to do so by presenting a number of formal criteria that are intended to distinguish pictorial symbol systems from non-pictorial ones, such as linguistic or diagrammatic symbol systems.
Both David's portrait and the name 'Napoleon' may be said to represent Napoleon. And it should also accommodate inaccurate or incorrect models, as well as accurate or correct ones.
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Of course, in certain cases such objects may be representational. A chair might be used in a work of abstract art, for example, or a table used to represent a shelter in a play.
II Models as make-believe (i)
Walton's theory: props and games
According to Walton, representations are props in games of make-believe. Suppose that some children play a game in the woods in which they imagine tree stumps to be bears. In Walton's terminology, in this game the tree stumps are props and the convention that the children establish by their agreement that stumps 'count as' bears is a principle of generation. Together, props and principles of generation make propositions fictional. To say that a proposition is fictional, on
Walton's theory, is to say that there is a prescription to imagine it. (A fictional truth is simply the fact that a certain proposition is fictional.) Thus, given the rule that stumps 'count as' bears, if a participant in the game comes across a stump in a thicket, they are to imagine that there is a bear there; it is fictional that there is a bear there.
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What is fictional in a game of make-believe need not be the same as what is imagined. A stump which remains hidden under a pile of leaves still makes it fictional that a bear lurks there, even if this is never imagined by anyone playing the game. An oddly shaped stump might prompt one of the participants to imagine a wolf and not a bear, but the proposition that there is a wolf before them is only imagined, not fictional. Fictional truths therefore possess a certain kind of 'objectivity'; participants can be unaware of fictional truths and mistaken about them.
The stumps in the children's game are not representations, however. A representation, in Walton's sense, is not something that merely happens to be used as a prop; it is something of which it is the function to serve as such.
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Whether it is the function of a given object to serve as a prop depends upon social context. Walton's theory does not aim to analyse our ordinary use of the term 'representation', but to 'carve out a new category' that may be applied to what we might call works of fiction, including novels, paintings, sculptures, plays, films and musical works.
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Many other entities that we might normally call 'representations', such as most history books, newspaper articles, biographies or textbooks, Walton thinks, do not count as representations in his sense.
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The function of a biography of Napoleon, it seems, is not to prescribe imaginings about Napoleon, but to make certain claims about him. The biography does ask us to believe certain things of Napoleon, and it is 24
These central features of the account are introduced in Section 1.5 of Walton (1990) .
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See Section 1.7 of Walton (1990) .
26 Walton (1990), p2 27 See Chapter 2 of Walton (1990 War and Peace makes it fictional that Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812; it represents Napoleon as invading Russia in 1812. Sometimes, when we call something 'fictional' we do so to imply that it is false or even deceitful. To say a proposition is fictional in Walton's sense, however, is simply to say that there is a prescription to imagine it. This is perfectly compatible with truth. If a child screams when he comes across a stump in the woods, it will probably be fictional that he screams; it is both fictional and true that the child screams. Similarly, of course, it is true, as well as fictional in War and Peace, that Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. In this respect, the novel corresponds to Napoleon.
If a representation corresponds completely with its object then it matches it. But a work may represent something it does not match and match something it does not represent. It is fictional in
The War of the Worlds that Martians attack London in the late nineteenth century. The novel represents London, but does not match it. Conversely, a portrait of John may match his twin brother
David, but it represents John and not David.
As well as prescribing imaginings, the stumps in the children's game are also objects of those imaginings: the children imagine of the stumps that they are bears. This is not a necessary condition for something to count as a prop. The text of War and Peace may prescribe us to imagine many things of Napoleon, but we do not imagine the text of the novel itself to be Napoleon. Some works of fiction do prescribe imaginings about themselves, however. For example, we are to imagine that the first chapter of the novel Dracula is an excerpt from a journal. Walton calls these reflexive representations.
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The principle that wherever there is a stump, fictionally, there is a bear, was established by participants in the game by explicit stipulation. But Walton's theory does not demand that principles of generation be established in this way, nor that they be explicitly formulated. And indeed, many 28 See Chapter 3 of Walton (1990) .
Ibid.., p117 implicit rules are likely to operate in the children's game: it may well be that if the stump in the thicket is taller than the stump under the leaves, then, fictionally, the bear in the thicket is taller than the bear hiding in the leaves. In the case of novels or paintings, principles of generation are difficult to specify explicitly, complex, and vary from case to case. The principles that apply to novels are conditional upon the text of the novel; those that apply to paintings or statues depend upon the distribution of paint on the canvas or on the form of the sculpted marble.
(ii) Make-believe and model-representation
With this outline of Walton's theory in place, let us now begin to apply it to scientific models. I propose that we regard all physical models in this way, as props in games of make-believe, which represent their objects by prescribing imaginings about them. The principles of generation by which models prescribe imaginings will vary from case to case. Were the bridge model built to carry out structural tests, for example, one principle of generation in effect may be that if the model is built from a certain material then it is fictional that the bridge is also built from that material. If, instead, the model were built for a museum display, however, this principle may not hold. Furthermore, not all physical models are scale models. The famous Phillips machine represents the workings of the macro-economy by the ebb and flow of coloured water in a hydraulic system. The principles guiding our imaginings when we use the Phillips machine will be very different from those that apply to the bridge model. One principle may be that if water is flowing through a certain pipe then, fictionally, taxes are being paid. Many physical models are reflexive representations, in Walton's sense: they 30 The suggestion that Walton's theory may be applied in the context of scientific modelling is also made in Barberousse (2006) , Barberousse and Ludwig (2000) and Frigg (2010) . See below for a discussion of Frigg's views. prescribe imaginings about themselves. When we use the bridge model, for example, we not only imagine things of the bridge; we also imagine that the model itself is the bridge. Similarly, we imagine the balls of a ball-and-stick chemical model to be atoms, and the sticks to be bonds between them. Physical models need not be reflexive, however. When we use the Phillips machine, perhaps we do not imagine the flow of water itself to be the payment of taxes, but only that taxes are being paid.
Let us now turn to consider theoretical modelling. When we model the bouncing spring we write down an equation of motion m d 2 x / dt 2 =−kx , and a prepared description, which takes the bob to be a point mass m subject to a linear restoring force, and so on. I believe these may be understood in the same way that Walton understands literary works of fiction. Consider the following passage from
The War of the Worlds:
The dome of St. Paul's was dark against the sunrise, and injured, I saw for the first time, by a huge gaping cavity on its western side. has a large hole in its dome. In Walton's terminology, the passage makes it fictional that St Paul's has a large hole in its dome.
I think we may use Walton's analysis to provide an account of our prepared description and equation of motion. We have seen that these are not straightforward descriptions of the bouncing spring.
Nevertheless, I believe, they do represent the spring, in Walton's sense: they represent the spring by prescribing imaginings about it. When we put forward our prepared description and equation of motion, I think, those who are familiar with the process of theoretical modelling understand that they are to imagine certain things about the bouncing spring. Specifically, they are required to imagine that the bob is a point mass, that the spring exerts a linear restoring force, and so on. Unlike some physical models, our theoretical model is not a reflexive representation: we do not imagine that our description or equation are themselves a point mass or subject to a linear restoring force. Instead, our description and equation prescribe imaginings about the bouncing spring system. The bouncing spring 31 Wells (2005), p170 is an object of our model; our model represents it as a point mass, subject to a linear restoring force and a uniform gravitational field. Using Walton's terminology, we may say that our prepared description and equation of motion make it fictional that the bob is a point mass, that it is subject to a linear restoring force and so on.
My suggestion, then, is that models function as props in games of make-believe; model-representation is an instance of representation in Walton's sense. Tentatively, I claim that this notion of modelrepresentation applies to all physical and theoretical modelling. In physical modelling, the prop is a physical object, while in theoretical modelling, it is usually a prepared description and equation of motion. In some cases, the prop might be a diagram or picture. Just as for novels or paintings, the principles of generation governing the games in which these props function are complex and vary from case to case. In each case, however, the model represents in virtue of prescribing us to imagine things. We may formulate this account as follows: On the account I propose, then, where a model represents an actual system, it does so by prescribing imaginings about that system; in Walton's terminology, it makes propositions about the system fictional. However, the primary statement of the account remains that given in MM: a model M is a model-representation, if and only if, if functions as a prop in a game of make-believe; it need not prescribe imaginings about any actual system. We shall see the importance of this feature of the account in Section III.
In the remainder of this paper, I will try to demonstrate the advantages of the account of representation I have proposed. First, however, it is important that this account is distinguished from another recent application of Walton's theory to scientific models. Frigg (2010) we write down when we model the bouncing spring, for example, do not prescribe us to imagine an 'imagined' or 'hypothetical' ideal oscillator. Rather, they prescribe us to imagine propositions about the actual bouncing spring: we imagine of the actual bob that it is a point mass and of the actual spring that it is massless, and so on. For more on the ontology of theoretical modelling, see Toon (2010) .
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The suggestion that models might be understood as fictional entities is found in Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Frigg (2006b) . Contessa (2010) follows this approach by developing his own 'dualist' account of fictional entities, while Thomson-Jones (2007) also explores versions of this view. 35 Frigg (2010), p264.
(iii)
Make-believe and stipulation
In Section I, I argued that we may accept Callender and Cohen's arguments in favour of adopting a derivative account of scientific representation, while rejecting their claim that stipulation is sufficient for scientific representation. The account I have proposed offers a derivative account: it explains the representational power of models in terms of the representational power of certain mental states, namely those of the imagination. For example, the bridge model represents the bridge in virtue of prescribing users to imagine that the bridge is a certain shape, length and so on. Unlike Callender and Cohen's stipulation view, however, my account is able to distinguish model-representation from cases of mere denotation or reference.
According to MM1, in order to be a model-representation of some object, a model must not only refer to that object; there must be an understanding amongst those who use the model that various imaginings are prescribed that depend upon the features of the model. This is absent in the case of Callender and Cohen's salt shaker. The act of stipulation they describe may establish that the salt shaker refers to Madagascar, but there is no understanding among the diners that they are to imagining anything about Madagascar, given the properties of the salt shaker. For the same reason, my account is also able to exclude proper names: no convention exists such that we are to imagine certain things of the DNA molecule depending upon the properties of the name 'DNA molecule', such as the number of letters it has or whether it is written in English or French.
Earlier, we observed that the form of a name like 'DNA molecule' is ultimately arbitrary, while that of a scientific model is often crucial to its representational function. Furthermore, we noted that scientific models seem to 'tell us' something about their objects, while names do not, and that what the model tells us can be right or wrong. We are now in a position to explain these differences. The reason that the properties of a model are important to its representational function, while those of names or Callender and Cohen's salt shaker are not, is that the imaginings the model prescribes about its object are conditional on those properties. What a model 'tells us' about its object is dependent on the content of those imaginings, and what it tells us is right or wrong depending on whether the propositions it asks us to imagine are true or false of that object.
Under certain circumstances, the salt shaker could become a model-representation of Madagascar.
For example, we might imagine the shaker being used to indicate the location of Madagascar with respect to Africa (the dinner plate). In this case, the salt shaker (together with the dinner plate) would constitute a model-representation on my account: the salt shaker's properties prescribe us to imagine something about Madagascar, according to rules such as 'if the shaker is to the right of the plate, you are to imagine that Madagascar is to the east of Africa'. One way to establish this rule would be to declare it explicitly. As we have seen, however, principles of generation need not be stated explicitly.
Many suggest themselves to us almost 'automatically'. Once we have explicitly specified that the salt shaker denote Madagascar and the plate denote Africa, it is almost inevitable that we will associate the relative positions of the salt shaker and the plate with the relative positions of Madagascar and Africa. The ease with which we understand such conventions, however, should not mislead us into neglecting their importance. No familiar principles of generation come to mind when we are told that the salt shaker represents Madagascar. (Its shape does not readily suggest taking it to be a scale model of Madagascar, for example.) In the absence of such principles, the salt shaker fails to modelrepresent Madagascar and merely refers to it; its properties are irrelevant to its representational function, and it can tell us nothing about Madagascar.
(iv)
Make-believe, misrepresentation and realism On most accounts of scientific modelling, accuracy is judged in terms of some form of similarity or fit between a model and the world. For example, as we have seen, Giere takes theoretical models to be abstract objects defined by the prepared descriptions and equations of motion scientists write down when they model a system. The accuracy of a theoretical model is then a matter of the similarity between this abstract object and the system in certain respects and to certain degrees. In contrast to this indirect view of theoretical modelling, I propose a direct view. then, the accuracy of a model is dependent upon the truth (or perhaps the approximate truth) of the propositions it prescribes us to imagine about the system it represents. This view may be applied to physical, as well as theoretical models; as we have seen, on my account, even physical models prescribe us to imagine propositions about their objects.
(v) Models and works of fiction
Many of entities to which Walton applies his theory, such as novels, painting and films, are central examples of works of fiction. If Walton does indeed offer the correct analysis of these works then, on my account, model-representation turns out to be an instance of a wider form of representation also instantiated by such works. Some will object to this comparison. Surely there are many differences 36 Toon (2010) between our model of the bouncing spring and works of fiction such as War of the Worlds, or between an architect's scale model and a statue of Napoleon? Although I claim that models employ the same form of representation that Walton ascribes to works of fiction, I do not deny that there are many important differences between the two, as there are amongst works of fiction themselves. Similarly, to claim that some scientific drawings employ the same mode of representation as cartoons and Surrealist paintings, namely depiction, would not prevent us recognising the enormous differences between these different representations.
And, although there clearly are important differences between models and some works of fiction, I
think it is less clear where to draw a line between them, if one can be drawn at all. It is clearly not correct to say that the imaginings models prescribe are generally true, or even approximately true, whereas those prescribed by works of fiction are not. As we have seen, even good models prescribe many false imaginings about their objects. Conversely, works of historical fiction often prescribe many true imaginings about actual characters and events, as do many portraits. Moreover, given that we know that something is a work of historical fiction or a portrait, it is arguable that we are entitled to expect the work to be accurate in these ways. The same considerations also show that we cannot draw the distinction in terms of whether or not the works aim at truth. One important function of many scientific models is that of providing us with predictions. But, again, this does not give a clear criterion for distinguishing models from works of fiction. On the one hand, it seems that some models are not used to provide predictions. Obvious examples here are the models we will consider in Part III, which do not represent an actual object. And on the other hand, it is arguable that some works of fiction offer predictions. One example here might be Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four.
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III Models without actual objects (i)
The variety of models without actual objects
As we noted in Section I(i), the problem of scientific representation is usually presented as that of giving an account of a relation between a model and some actual system, just as the problem of depiction is often said to be that of identifying a relation between a picture and its subject. We also observed, however, that many pictures seem to be depictive, even though they depict no actual 37 Note also that the position I advocate is distinct from what Arthur Fine calls fictionalism. (Fine (1998) . As Fine characterises it, fictionalism is an anti-realist position which argues that a scientific theory may be reliable without being true and without the entities it invokes existing. To classify a model as a representation in Walton's sense is to say nothing about the truth of the propositions the model prescribes or about the existence of the entities it invokes.
subject. An illustrated edition of Dracula might contain a picture of Count Dracula, for example, his fangs dripping with blood. It seems that the picture represents or depicts Dracula, in a similar way to that in which a portrait like David's Napoleon Crossing the Saint Bernard depicts Napoleon. Of course, Count Dracula does not exist in the same way as Napoleon did. But if the painting represents Dracula, must he not exist in some sense? These problems also arise for discourse about fiction. If we say 'Dracula sucks blood' it seems we assert something true. And yet if Dracula does not exist, to what does the name 'Dracula' refer? Solutions to these problems fall into two camps.
Accommodationist theories grant fictional entities like Count Dracula some place in our ontology.
Eliminativist theories attempt to show how fiction, and our discourse about it, may be understood without granting the existence of fictional entities.
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Many scientific models pose parallel problems. Obvious examples are models of entities we once thought to exist but now know not to. Nineteenth century physicists constructed mechanical models of the ether. Even if, as we now believe, the ether does not exist, these models still seem to be representational. Intuitively, we want to say that ether models represent something, even though we know there is no ether. Just as we seem to need Dracula to understand pictures of the Count, so we seem to need the ether to understand the physicists' models. The problem also arises for our discourse: just as we make statements that seem to refer to Dracula, so we might make statements that appear to refer to the ether, like 'the ether is at rest'.
The problems posed by models without actual objects is rarely recognised. Where it is recognised, it is always models of discredited entities like the ether or phlogiston that are offered as examples. In fact, however, problems with fictional entities arise for a much wider range of cases. Many of these are rather mundane. For example, suppose that engineers constructing a bridge invite architects to submit models of their proposed designs. Like the ether models, a model proposing an unsuccessful design would still seem to be representational, even if there is no actual bridge that it represents.
Many scientific experiments create events which may never otherwise occur; a scientist might formulate a theoretical model of such an event even if funding runs out and the experiment never takes place. Or again, while using a ball-and-stick chemical model we might construct any number of models that represent configurations of atoms that do not exist.
In addition to examples such as these, there are clearly many cases of models that represent no particular actual object or event. We say that Bohr's model 'represents the hydrogen atom', for example, but presumably it does not represent any particular hydrogen atom (although it might be used to do so). In fact, it is arguable that most scientific models are of this form. In some cases, such 38 The terms 'accommodationist' and 'eliminativist' are taken from Lamarque (2003) .
as that of the Bohr model, we might think that the model represents a type of entity or event. R.I.G.
Hughes elects to 'assume without argument that our concept of denotation allows us to denote a type' and offers Bohr's model as an example. Analogous cases exist in scientific modelling. Consider the Phillips machine. The machine could be used to represent some actual economy, such as that of Britain. Alternatively, perhaps it could be used to represent a type of economy. But we could also use the machine simply to represent a particular 'imaginary' or fictional economy. (We might begin by saying 'suppose there were an economy like this…'.) Or, to take another example, suppose that the 'prepared description' and equation of motion that we write down when we model the bouncing spring system were to appear instead in a textbook, written to instruct students on how to model a bouncing spring like ours. In this case, it seems there will be no actual system that the model represents, nor type of system. Instead, it represents an 'imaginary' or fictional bouncing spring that the student is to imagine encountering.
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Need an account of representation for scientific models accommodate those without actual objects?
Callender and Cohen suggest we might 'bite the bullet and hold that, in cases where x doesn't exist, agents don't succeed in representing x but merely believe they are representing x'.
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As we have seen, this would be to exclude a considerable number of models from our account of representation.
Moreover, in many of the cases we have considered, agents do not even believe that they are 39 Hughes (1997) , S330-1 40 Goodman (1976), p26 41 This example reminds us that the same prepared description and equation of motion may serve very different representational functions. 42 Callender and Cohen (2006), p81 n11 representing an actual object. Most importantly, however, I think it is simply wrong to deny that models without actual objects are representational.
A comparison with pictures is helpful. We take for granted that pictures without actual objects are representational. Of course, we recognise that when we say that The Milkmaid is a 'picture of a milkmaid' this does not license the inference that the milkmaid exists. However, even if she does not, the picture is undoubtedly still depictive. Indeed, our experience of the picture depends very little upon whether or not the milkmaid exists. We can still stand before the painting and admire her care and concentration in her task, just as we might look at David's portrait and admire Napoleon's bravery and determination. The same is true of models. Consider the architects' models discussed earlier, each showing proposals for a bridge design. Suppose that these models were all put on display after the bridge is built. If we were to inspect the models without knowing which was chosen, our experience of the unsuccessful models would be very similar to that of the successful one.
Looking at these models, which might be built from balsa wood or paper or construction kit, and might be a metre or ten metres high, we could still recognise each as representing a bridge to be built across the river, and discuss whether that bridge is ugly or beautiful, flimsy or strong. Similarly, we realise that when we say a model 'represents the ether' we cannot conclude that there is an actual object that it represents. But the model is still representational. Indeed, the representational properties of ether models may have played an important role in allowing scientists to determine whether or not the ether exists.
In the next section, I will consider whether existing accounts of scientific representation can accommodate models without actual objects. First, however, it is important that our present problem is distinguished from another way in which scientific modelling is sometimes thought to give rise to fictional entities. This route to fictional entities arises from theoretical modelling of actual objects, like our model of the bouncing spring. When we model the spring we make assumptions that are true of no actual system: no actual pendulum is a point mass, no actual spring is massless, and so on.
Recently, as we have already seen, a number of authors have suggested that our model of the bouncing spring is itself a fictional entity that satisfies these modelling assumptions. On this indirect view of theoretical modelling, our prepared description and equation of motion define a fictional idealised oscillator, and this, in turn, represents the bouncing spring. Theoretical models are themselves taken to be fictional entities.
I have argued against this view elsewhere.
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For now, we may simply note that the ontology of theoretical models themselves is not the problem that concerns us here. We want to know how our 43 Toon (2010) account of representation can accommodate models without actual objects. It is possible for these two problems to become confused. Speaking loosely, we might say that our model of the bouncing spring 'represents' a point mass or a massless spring. Point masses and massless springs do not exist, of course, and it is tempting to label them as 'fictional entities'. Speaking more carefully, however, we should say that our model represents an actual pendulum bob as a point mass and it represents an actual spring as massless and frictionless. For this reason, it does not present the same problem as models like the ether model.
Moreover, even if we take theoretical models to be fictional entities, rather than linguistic entities or abstract objects, this does not solve the problem posed by models that represent no actual object. To see this, consider the theoretical model mentioned above, which represents an experimental event that never occurs. The problem we are faced with is that of explaining how it is that this model is representational, given that there is no actual object that it represents. Taking the model itself to be a fictional entity, rather than, say, a linguistic entity or abstract object, does not solve this problem. Or again, suppose that, before it was discovered not to exist, someone had produced a theoretical model of the ether that was thought to offer a highly simplified account of its behaviour. Even if we were to take the scientists' ether model to be a fictional entity, defined by whatever assumptions and equations they wrote down, we would still be left with the problem that this model, like a mechanical ether model, seems intuitively to represent the ether, even though there is no ether.
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(ii) Existing accounts of scientific representation and models without actual Similarly, Frigg (2010) suggests that the problem of models without actual objects can be avoided simply by adopting his distinction between p-representation and t-representation. This alone does not seem sufficient to solve the problem, however: we still require an account of t-representation that can explain how some model systems (like the simplified ether model system) can be representational, without representing any actual object. 45 Frigg (2006a), Suárez (1999) and (2003) 46 Giere (2004) . Giere allows there may be other ways in which models are used to represent, although does not specify any. See also Giere (1988) and . 47 Hughes (1997), S331. 'D.D.I.' stands for 'denotation, demonstration, and interpretation'. According to Hughes, these combine in the following way: `Elements of the physical world are denoted by elements of the on Callender and Cohen's view, representation in modelling is a relation established by an act of stipulation connecting a model and its object. As they stand, none of these accounts can explain why models without actual objects are representational. An ether model cannot represent in virtue of its similarity or isomorphism to the ether if the ether does not exist, nor could a scientist list the model and ether's similarities in a theoretical hypothesis. The model also cannot denote or stand for the ether, and we cannot establish a representation relation between the model and the ether by stipulation.
If accounts that take representation in modelling to be a relation are to be applied to models without actual objects, then their proponents must posit some object for these models to represent. That is, they must adopt an accommodationist stance on fictional entities. Whether this is thought to be problematic would depend upon which accommodationist view was adopted and how palatable its ontological commitments were taken to be. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the problem disappears once we posit fictional entities. In fact, questions would remain for each of the accounts. For example, would the objects posited to serve as fictional entities have the right properties to enter into relations of similarity or isomorphism with models? The claim that models may denote fictional entities, just as they denote actual entities, would also be open to debate.
Fictional objects are dependent on representations for their existence in a way that actual objects are not; the relation between a representation and a fictional object, if there are any, would therefore appear very different from that between a representation and an actual object. 48 Finally, could we say that the ether model is representational because it was stipulated that it represent a fictional ether? If any stipulation occurred it was surely that the model represent the real ether.
The only account of scientific representation that attempts to accommodate models that represent no actual object is Mauricio Suárez's 'inferential conception'. On this view, a representational source A represents some target B 'only if (i) the representational force of A points towards B and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding B.' How is this supposed to work? Consider an ether model. Even though the ether does not exist, perhaps there is a sense in which we might say that the model possesses a representational force 'towards the ether' just as, for example, a model of the Forth Road Bridge possesses a representational force towards the bridge. The ether model is rather like a description such as 'the only inhabitant of London': both purportedly pick out an object; they simply fail to do so because that object does not exist. However, it is not clear that we may say this in all cases. For example, consider the case discussed above, in which the Phillips machine is used to represent an 'imaginary' economy.
Unlike the creator of an ether model, the user of the Phillips machine does not attempt, but fail, to represent an actual object. When used in this way, the Phillips machine does not purport to represent any actual object. As a result, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that this model possesses a representation force, even a thwarted one, presuming that representational force always points towards actual objects or events. Of course, we might attempt to get round this problem by granting the existence of fictional entities and allowing that representational force may point to them too. But then the claim that there is no difference between representation of fictional entities and of actual ones would require further argument for, as mentioned already, the relation between a representation and a fictional object and the relation between a representation and an actual object would appear to be rather different.
(iii)
Models as make-believe and models without actual objects
Unlike similarity and isomorphism accounts, Hughes' D.D.I. account or Callender and Cohen's stipulation view, the account of models I set out above (MM) does not take representation in modelling to be a relation. It is therefore able to accommodate models that represent no actual object without postulating some object for them to represent. Something is a model-representation if it has the function of serving as a prop in games of make-believe; it is not a necessary condition for modelrepresentation that there be any object that the model prescribe imaginings about. Ether models, or the textbook model of a bouncing spring or the model for an experiment that does not take place, are all representational because they function as a prop in a game of make-believe; all of them are taken to prescribe imaginings. They can still fulfil this role even if there is no object that they prescribe imaginings about.
Of course, other accounts of representation in art and elsewhere, apart from Walton's, acknowledge that it may fail to be a relation in certain cases. Problems concerning fictional entities have not been entirely dispelled, however. For in addition to prescribing many unproblematic imaginings, such as that the speed of light is constant or that electromagnetic waves are transverse, intuitively it seems that an ether model will also prescribe imaginings 'about the ether'. For example, it may ask us to imagine that the ether is at rest. Once again, then, we meet the problem of fictional entities, this time for imagination: how are we to understand the contents of imaginings that appear directed towards fictional entities like the ether?
This is certainly a problem, but it is not one that a theory of representation for scientific models need address. Instead, it is a general problem that faces all theories of intentionality. And it is a problem that will exist whatever account of representation we adopt for scientific models; even those who hold similarity or isomorphism accounts will concede that we often appear to imagine things of the ether.
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The same is true of the problem posed by discourse apparently referring to fictional entities, like 'the ether is at rest' or 'the bridge is stable' (said in reference to a failed bridge model). This too is a general problem that exists whatever our account of scientific representation and is the subject of longstanding debate.
51 Goodman (1976) , p228. Emphasis in original.
Callender and Cohen also attempt to defer the problem posed by models without actual objects, observing that 'the worry arises for all species of representation -not just scientific representation -and there is no reason to suspect that whatever ultimately explains representations of unicorns and golden mountains won't work for representation of phlogiston and the ether' (Callender and Cohen (2006), p81) . There is an important difference between Callender and Cohen's deferral strategy and my own, however. Callender and Cohen simply express a hope that a solution to the problem for other forms of representation may be applied to scientific models. They tentatively suggest a 'Humean strategy', which provides a relational theory for 'atomic' representations and explains representations without actual objects as constructed as 'compounds' of other representations. But they do not show whether this can be applied to scientific models, nor whether their account would remain intact if it were. This amounts simply to deferring the problem for scientific representation itself. By contrast, my own account reduces the problem of understanding models without actual objects to the more general problem of understanding imaginings about fictional entities.
Conclusion
Scientific models are props in games of make-believe, which represent their objects by prescribing imaginings about them. Analysing models in this way allows us to accommodate models which represent their objects inaccurately, while showing how models differ from merely denoting entities, like Callender and Cohen's salt shaker. Since this account does not take representation in modelling to be essentially relational, it is also able to accommodate an important group of models that have been largely ignored by recent philosophical work on modelling, namely those that are representational, but represent no actual object.
